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JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED-A 
REMEDY FOR THE THIRD DEGREE* 
Paul G. Kaupert 
IN its report on "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" the Wicker-sham Commission concludes that in the police systems of a number 
of American municipalities the "third degree" is very generally prac-
ticed as a means of extorting from accused persons under arrest con-
fessions, incriminating statements, and other information of value to 
the police.1 The conclusion of the Commission confirms the results of 
private investigation made in the same field.2 It is true that the 
methods of inquiry pursued by the Commission leave doubt as to the 
accuracy of some of the facts reported.3 But the quality of the evidence 
submitted as ~e result of this and prior investigations establishes at 
least a residuum of "naked, ugly facts," the authenticity of which can-
not reasonably be denied. 
Assuming third degree practices by the police to be an established 
fact, the problem of a remedy for the evil demands consideration.4 
* The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor John B. Waite 
of the Michigan Law School for his many helpful criticisms and suggestions in the 
preparation of this article; the writer, however, assumes sole responsibility for all that 
appears therein. 
t University of Michigan Law School. A. B., Earlham College.-Ed. 
1 WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. II, Part 1, "The Third Degree" (1931). In 
connection with this official report, see also the recent publication, OuR LAWLESS 
PoLICE, by ERNEST JEROME HOPKINS, one of the official investigators employed by the 
Commission. His observations as to third degree practices are found in chapters 
13-18. 
2 See J. A. Larson, "Present Police and Legal Methods for the Determination of 
Innocence or Guilt of the Suspect," 16 J. CRIM. L. 219-271 (1925); B. Booth, 
"Confessions and the Methods Employed in Procuring Them," 4 So. CAL. L. REv. 83 
(1930). 
3 See Professor Waite's criticism of the Commission's method of investigation in 
his comment on Report No. II, 30 MICH. L. REV. 54-58 (1931). Also his review of 
HoPKINs, OuR LAWLESS PoLicE, in 30 MtcH. L. REV. 820 (1932). 
4 For an analysis of proposed remedies see Z. Chafee, Jr., "Remedies for the 
Third Degree," 148 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 621 (1931). The value of Professor 
Chafee's discussion is enhanced by the fact that he was one of the "Consultants" em-
ployed by the Wickersham Commission. Apparently his investigation in this capacity 
has convinced him of the futility of proposed remedies suggested by. him seven years 
earlier in an article, "Compulsory Confessions," 40 NEW REPUBLIC 266 (1924). 
It is undoubtedly true, as pointed out by the Wickersham Commission, that a 
fundamental line of approach in solving the problem of the third degree is to im-
prove the police personnel and develop a scientific detective technique. This article, 
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Such practices discredit the administration of criminal justice; they 
often subject innocent persons arrested to a species of coercion reminis-
cent of the days of the Inquisition. But even if the accused is guilty, 
they violate constitutional rights meant for the protection of all, they 
engender disrespect for law-enforcing agencies, and they impair the 
morale of the police system itself. 
Judicial examination of the accused, we shall suggest in the follow-
ing discussion as the most promising remedy for these police abuses. 
But before considering this suggestion in detail it is essential to refer 
to other remedies now in vogue or which have been proposed. 
CRIMINAL AND ToRT LIABILITY 
The checks on illegal activities of the police on which reliance is 
mainly placed today are civil and criminal liabilities. At common law 
an officer who makes an arrest is liable in tort for the use of force in 
excess of that required to preserve custody. 6 Similarly he is liable for 
criminal assault and in a. number of states express legislation has at-
tached criminal liability. to. the acts of an officer in coercing a prisoner 
to confess. 6 Yet, despite existing liabilities in crime and tort, the third 
degree :flourishes. Nor can it be expected that such liabilities will 
supply the requisite deterrent. As regards civil liability the restrain-
ing in:fluence if any must be measured by the offending officer's capacity 
to respond in damages; if he is judgment-proof, it is not difficult to 
calculate the quantum of deterring influence. 7 The jury's sympathy in 
favor of one regarded as a protector of the social order makes it diffi-
cult for the plaintiff to secure a verdict in such a case. Basically it is 
unsound to rely on private litigation to curb defects in administrative 
law. That should be the duty of the state. 8 But even granting the 
correctness of the theory in relying on tort liability to make police offi-
cers behave themselves, and granting that the aggrieved plaintiff is 
financially able to institute a suit, and granting that the jury will re-
turn a verdict against the delinquent officer, and granting that the de-
fendant has assets sufficient to make the judgment worth more than a 
:flourish, it is still unlikely that third degree practices will be affected 
however, is concerned only with a proposed change in criminal procedure as a means 
of contributing to the solution of the problem. 
5 AM. L. INST. TENTATIVE RESTATEM'.ENT OF ToRTS, No. 3, sec. I 57, and com-
ment thereon (1927). 
6 The statutes are collected in WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. II, 213 (1931). 
7 See Bohlen and Shulman, "Effect of Subsequent Misconduct Upon a Lawful 
Arrest," 28 CoL. L. REv. 841, 844, note II (1928). 
8 Bohlen and Shulman, 28 CoL. L. REV. 841 (1928). 
40 
No. 8 REMEDY FOR THIRD DEGREE 1226 
by this remote penalty. The use of the fist and rubber hose as auxil-
iary measures in extracting confessions from a recalcitrant prisoner is a 
response to the police exigencies of the moment. A police detective 
anxious for clues is not going to speculate on the possibilities of losing 
his house eighteen months from now as a result of slapping the prison-
er's face or giving his wrist an uncomfortable twist. The same consid-
erations are germane in discussing the deterring effect of criminal lia-
bilities. If the penalty is severe, the difficulty is augmented of getting 
a sympathetic jury to return a verdict of guilty against one whose 
offense was a misguided zeal exercised for the public good.9 Fellow-
officers are under a strong inducement to give perjured testimony in 
order to clear their comrade on the force. Moreover, the prosecuting 
attorney who by tacit acquiescence, to say nothing of express approba-
tion, encourages officers to procure confessions, thereby lightening the 
labor of his office, is not likely to be zealous in prosecuting official law-
lessness. Add to all this the hiatus in time and psychological difference 
between the immediate desire -for clues and the remote threat of the 
penalty and we must perceive that the deterring influence of criminal 
as well as civil liability is of a very attenuated nature.10 
MAK.ING CONFESSIONS OBTAINED BY POLICE INADMISSIBLE 
Another remedy- one that has been recently proposed - is to 
make confessions obtained by the police inadmissible in evidence. This 
would operate, it has been thought, indirectly to check illegal prac-
tices by rendering futile the work of the officers in obtaining confessions. 
Attempted legislation in California in 1929 represent the most extreme 
of these proposals. It would make inadmissible any confession except a 
voluntary statement made before a magistrate after the prisoner had 
been inform~d of his rights including the right to counsel.11 A saner 
9 Illustrating the practical difficulty in securing a conviction under such a statute, 
the opinion of the Indiana court in Bonahoon v. State (Ind. 1931) 178 N. E. 570, 
sustaining a conviction of police detectives under such an act, mentions the fact that 
at the trial prominent citizens of Fort Wayne testified regarding the good character 
and reputation of the defendants. 
10 Professor Chafee, writing in 148 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 6z1, 6z3 (1931), is of 
the opinion that "criminal statutes have no appreciable tendency to check these 
abuses." 
11 B. Booth, 4 So. CAL. L. REv. 83, 84 (1930). Simifar in terms to the defeated 
Californ,ia bill was the suggestion made by Messrs. Chisolm and Hart in their paper, 
"Methods of Obtaining Confessions and Information From Persons Accused of 
Crime," presented before the American Prison Association in 19zi,_ Russell Sage 
Foundation Publication No. CH43, 18 (19zz), prohibiting police interrogation or 
examination of the accused except in the presence of a Public Defender or accused's 
41 
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recommendation of this type would make a confession admissible 
only if the state showed it to be a voluntary statement spontaneously 
made by the accused to the police, but would exclude confessions elici-
ted by police interrogation unless under the supervision of a magis-
trate.12 This approximates the English rule requiring that an officer 
caution the prisoner before interrogation and forbidding cross-examina-
tion except for the purpose of explaining an ambiguity after a voluntary 
statement has been made.13 
Proposals of this type are objectionable on several grounds. The 
psychological moment for a voluntary confession, as Dean Wigmore 
has pointed out, comes immediately after arrest when the prisoner is 
laboring under the psychic pressure of guilt and feels most acutely the 
hopelessness of his position.u At this precise moment the desire for 
relief by making a "clean breast" is at its height. With the passage of 
time and intervention of friend and counsel, a defense mechanism is 
set into motion. From the public's point of view it would be unwise 
to repress confessions made by the accused while in police custody. 
Nor should the mere fact of interrogation, unaccompanied by coercive 
methods, vitiate the undoubted evidentiary worth of a confession thus 
procured. 
And would a statute rendering inadmissible all statements taken 
by the police contribute in any substantial way to mitigate third degree 
abuses? Would police motives for interrogation be repressed by plac-
ing the taint of inadmissibility on the information thus procured? The 
third degree has utility for the police apart from procuring a confession 
to be used at the trial some time later. Coercive questioning of the sus-
pected person is immediately useful to the police in unearthing other 
evidence of guilt, in pumping for information as to the whereabouts of 
stolen property, and in inducing the arrested man to "squeal" on his 
partners. In a day when corporate crime and gang warfare are ram-
own counsel. See also F. Irvine, ''Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self Crim-
inatj.on," 13 CoRN. L. Q. 211, 217 (1928). 
12 A recommendation to this effect is found in Report of Crimes Survey Commit• 
tee of Law Association of Philadelphia 467 (1926). 13 71 SoL. J. 686 (1927). In 74 SoL. J. 633-634 (1930) is found a reprint of 
the Memorandum issued by the Home Secretary regarding the taking of statements 
from persons in custody. 
A Texas statute rendering inadmissible a confession unless in writing, and made 
only after full caution, and a Kentucky statute prohibiting sweating are the only 
legislative enactments in this country at the present time placing such restrictions on 
the procurement of confessions and on police interrogation of the prisoner. See B. 
Booth, 4 So. CAL. L. REv. 83, 86 (1930). 
14 2 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 198 and note (1923). 
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pant, this last consideration furnishes a strong impelling motive for 
third degree practices. Furthermore, little comfort is afforded an in-
nocent man who has been a victim of abusive police methods by the as-
surance that if he had gone on trial, any statement pressed out of him 
would not have been admissible in evidence. It seems, then, that from 
the viewpoint of remedying the third degree evil, little if any good 
will be accomplished by departing from the orthodox rule that a con-
fession is admissible if voluntarily made.111 And in view of the desir-
ability of admitting confessions obtained by the police without resort to 
force, the modicum of benefit that might be expected of the proposed 
measure would not be worth the price.16 
REQUIRING POLICE TO PRESENT PRISONER IMMEDIATELY 
BEFORE A MAGISTRATE 
Third degree methods could be largely repressed if police were 
forced to present their prisoner immediately before a magistrate. 
Professor Chafee appropriately calls the period of police custody the 
"danger period." 17 And the whole problem of the third degree seems 
to resolve itself into one ·of reducing this danger period to a mini-
mum.18 The measures already discussed fail of their purpose because 
they bring no pressure on the officer to compel him to produce the 
prisoner at once for a judicial hearing. It is true that the police cannot 
be deprived completely of opportunity for private interrogation, how.:. 
111 The general rule is stated and discussed and the American cases collected in 2 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, sec. 851 (1923). It is assumed that this rule will exclude 
confessions made after prolonged interrogation and detention, as was held in Ziang 
Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 45 Sup. Ct. 1, 69 L. ed. 131 (1924), in 
which it was said by Mr. Justice Brandeis: "A confession is voluntary in law if, and 
only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made." , 
16 It is true, as pointed out by the WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. 11, 53 (1931), 
that in England police do not practice third degree methods. Though this may be 
ascribed to the greatly circumscribed power of interrogation allowed the police, a 
more persuasive explanation is to be found in the habits and morale that characterize 
the English police. 
Very little evidence is available on the question whether federal officers employ 
third-degree methods. It is generally believed that they do not. The absence of such 
abusive practices in the federal system of law enforcement may be attributed to two 
factors: the revolting types of crime - murder in particular -which in the eyes of the 
police justify coercive questioning, are seldom triable in federal courts; and federal 
judges, because of their life tenure and freedom from political control, would not 
readily tolerate such abuses. 
l'l' 148 ATALANTIC MONTHLY 621, 622 (1931). 
18 This assumes that after the police have brought the prisoner before a magis-
trate they cease to have control over his person, and the accused is thereafter turned 
over to the county jailer for custody. See 148 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 621, 625 (1931). 
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ever prompt the production before the magistrate. If an arrest is made 
at night and the magistrate is not available until the next morning, a 
number of hours must necessarily elapse while officers continue in con-
trol of the accused's person. But the officer dare not resort to violent 
physical abuse leaving visible welts and bruises on the prisoner's body, 
for prompt production before the magistrate will mean exposure of 
the unlawful acts. Third degree practices wilt under publicity. In 
addition, prompt production of the accused before a magistrate elimi-
nates the further type of police brutality resulting from prolonged 
interrogation and detention incommunicado. 
In point of fact it has long been the rule that an officer is under a 
duty to bring an arrested person before a magistrate immediately. 
Such was the common-law rule in regard to criminal procedure, and is 
the rule today.19 Statutes in a number of states expressly require that 
the accused be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay" 
for the purpose of a preliminary examination. 20 This is the rule 
adopted in the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Proced-
ure. 21 Similarly in the field of tort liability, an officer who detains the 
arrested person for an unreasonable length of time is liable in an action 
for false imprisonment.22 But the rule is not being enforced. Un-
lawful detention of the prisoner incommunicado so as to permit pro-
longed interrogation by the police, coupled with denial to the prisoner 
of food, sleep, and rest, constitutes one of the flagrant abuses of the 
present system. 23 In Chicago, illegal detention and detention incom-
municado are said to be common2' although the records show no irregu-
19 4 BL. CoMM. *296; 1 Cmrn, THE CRIMINAL LAw *59. The latter writes: 
"When the officer has made his ~rrest, he is, as soon as possible, to bring the party to 
the gaol or to the justice • • • and if he be guilty of unnecessary delay, it is a 
breach of duty." 
20 AM. L. lNsT. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., Tentative Draft No, 1, commentary to 
sec. 35 (1928). 
21Official Draft, sec. 35 (1930). 
22 CooLEY, ToRTS 258 (Throckmorton's ed. 1930); AM, L. INST, CoMMENTAR• 
ms ON ToRTS RESTATEMENT No. 3, sec. 161, p. 67 (1927); AM, L. INST, TENTATIVE 
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS No. 3, sec. 161, comment to clause (c), p. 135 (1927), 
Under the majority rule the officer who fails to produce the prisoner before a 
magistrate promptly becomes liable as a trespasser ab initio. CooLEY, TORTS 250 
(Throckmorton's ed. 1930). The rule is criticized by Bohlen and Shulman in 28 
CoL, L. REV. 841, 849 (1928) as a survival of the earlier practice of bolstering up 
the inadequacies of administrative justice through tort liability. 
23 WICKERSHAM CoMM, REP. No. 11, 72 et seq. ( 1931) ; HOPKINS, OUR LAW-
LESS PoucE, ch. 15 (1931). 
2
' A. J. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 24-26 (1927). 
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larity, due to false entries on the police blotter.25 In Dallas, Texas, 
the "incommuni~do cell" has institutionalized the practice of illegal 
detention which may last for even a week or more.26 In Philadelphia, 
the prisoner is held in "cold storage" until he assumes a penitent 
mood. 27 In Detroit, the police, by taking the prisoner "around the 
loop," effectively keep him in custody beyond the legal period; even 
when the accused's attorney, after learning of his client's plight and 
whereabouts, sues out a writ of habeas corpus, twenty-four hours are 
allowed for a return on. the writ, in accordance with an agreement 
worked out between judges, prosecutors, and police. 28 
Here, then, is an existing provision that on the face of it should 
check third degree practices. But it is not accomplishing that result. 
Police-magistrates and justices of the peace do not insist that officers 
bring the accused before them promptly. Judges, along with prosecut-
ors, police, and public, share the belief that extra-judicial interrogation 
is indispensable to the efficient administration of justice. If it be said 
with dogmatic correctness that judges and magistrates, mindful of their 
duty, should not sanction a departure from recognized rules of such 
vital importance to the prisoner, as a concession to police exigencies, it 
is answered that the system of electing judges is not calculated to pro-
duce that firmness of judicial action which will stand against a popular 
clamor for conviction at all costs. 29 A judge whose continued tenure 
of office depends on public approbation, and who believes that interro-
gation of the accused by the police is essential to protect the public 
against crime, is not inclined to remonstrate with police officers for fail-
ing to produce the prisoner for hearing promptly. 
Prompt and regular presentation of the accused before a magistrate 
211 WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. II, 127 (1931). 
25WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. II, 138 (1931). 
27 HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 171-175, 231 (1931). 
28 WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. II, 120-122 (1931); HoPKINS, OuR LAw-
LESS POLICE 128-136 (1931). 
29 "It is expecting too much of a judge who is elected for a short term on a small 
salary, who loses his practice on taking office, and who will soon be confronted with the 
exigency of reelection and campaigning therefor, to exert the needed authority at the 
probable expense of incurring unpopularity by so doing." WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. 
No. 8, 41 (1931). See also Stuart H. Perry, "The Courts, the Press, and the Pub-
lic," 30 MICH. L. REV. 228, 233 (1931). 
Professor Moley, in writing of the police magistrates' courts, says: "Machine poli-
tics is always heavily intrenched in the inferior courts." OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 29 
(1930). The Wickersham Commission in its Report No. II, 107 (1931), comments 
on the fact that in Boston, where police judges have a life tenure and consequently arc 
politically independent, prompt arraignment of the prisoner is insisted upon by the 
judges. 
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will not be considered normal procedure, nor will the rule be enforced 
by either police or magistracy, unless some effective method of interro-
gation before a magistrate can be substituted for the illegal interroga-
tion of the accused which is now carried on by police. 
At this point it is necessary to turn to a consideration of the distinc-
tion between judicial interrogation of the accused, which is here pro-
posed, and the ordinary preliminary examination which is already in 
vogue. The purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine 
whether there is a prima facia case for holding a suspected person for 
action by the grand jury or the prosecuting authorities. The require-
ment of prompt presentation of the accused before a magistrate is in-
tended to expedite the preliminary examination and prevent the pris-
oner's indefinite detention on mere suspicion. The preliminary exami-
nation serves as an opportunity for the prisoner to exculpate himself at 
the earliest possible moment. But it does not give an opportunity-
as judicial examination would be intended to do - for interrogating 
the prisoner himself or eliciting information from him.30 To appreciate 
the significance of the distinction between preliminary examination and 
judicial examination which is here proposed, the history and present 
status of the preliminary examination in Anglo-American criminal 
procedure must first be understood. 
I. Preliminary Examination in England 
In England the justice of the peace appeared at the outset as a 
royal officer armed with plenary police powers for the purpose of pro-
tecting the king's peace.31 It is believed that justices early developed 
the custom of making some kind of inquiry before they committed sus-
pected persons for formal accusation.32 The existing practice was legal-
so See Professor Waite's comment on the W1cKERSHAM CoMM, REP. No. I I, in 
30 M1cH. L. REv. 54, 58 (1931). The term "preliminary examination" is really a 
misnomer as applied to the modern preliminary hearing of the judicial inquiry type. 
Under the old English statutes of Philip and Mary there was a true examination - an 
interrogation by the magistrate of the prisoner for the purpose of securing information, 
The term examination persists, however, in modern procedure when what is meant is a 
preliminary hearing. As a matter of precise terminology we should distinguish between 
judicial examination and judicial hearing. But the term "preliminary examination" 
is so thoroughly established in current usage as a legal word of art with reference to the 
preliminary hearing that confusion might result if it were used in the more accurate 
sense to denote magisterial interrogation. 
31 See CHARLES A. BEARD, THE OFFICE OF THE JusTICE OF THE PEACE IN 
ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1904), 
32 MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 15 (1930). 
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ized by the statutes of Philip and Mary (1554-1555) which provided 
that justices of the peace, before committing or admitting to bail a 
prisoner charged with a felony, should take the examination of such 
prisoner and the information of those who brought him, the same to 
be reduced to writing. 83 As a formal device this institution was prob-
ably derived from Continental procedure.84 But, it should be empha-
sized, the principle of interrogation as such was not unknown to the 
common law.85 Holdsworth justified the procedure adopted by the 
statu~es of Philip and Mary as necessary in the sixteenth century "in 
order to secure the observance of the law and to protect the state 
against its enemies." 86 Under the statutes the examination, judicial 
only to the extent that it provided for the hearing of witnesses, re-
sembled chiefly the inquisitorial proceeding of the Continent. The 
accused was fully questioned as to all circumstances connected with his 
supposed o:ffense.87 There was apparently no limit to the length of 
time allowed for the inquiry; the justice often remanded the prisoner 
to gaol for further detention, and subsequently ordered another hear-
ing after new evidence was uncovered.38 The accused was not informed 
of the evidence against him, 89 and he was not entitled to counsel at the 
examination."0 The evidence was preserved41 in writing for the judges 
33 l & 2 P. & M., c, 13, sec. 4 (1554); 2 & 3 P. & M., c. IO, sec. 2 (1555). 
84 Bentham in 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 289 {1827), refers to it 
as "a sprig of common sense imported from the continent of Europe." See also 
RoscoE PouND, CRIMINAL JusncE IN AMERICA 87 (1930). 
85 Stephen, 1 JURIDICAL SocJETY PAPERS 456, 466 {1858); 4 W1GMORE, Ev1-
DENCE 810, 8II (1923). It was said by Lord Bacon in Countess of Shrewsbury's 
Case, 2 State Trials 770, 778 (16i2): "No subject was ever brought in causes of 
estate to trial judicial, but first he passed examination; for examination is the entrance 
of justice in criminal causes: it is one of the eyes of the king's politic body: there are 
but two - information and examination: it may not be endured that one of the lights 
be put out by your example." 
It is a cherished notion but one lacking in historical foundation that the principle. 
of interrogation of the accused formally adopted by the statutes of Philip and Mary 
was opposed to the common-law tradition. 4 BL. CoMM. *296; 1 CHITTY, THE 
CRIMINAL LAw *83 (1836); l GREENLEAF, EvmENcE, sec. 224 (1892). 
86 4 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 529 (1924). 
87 I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 221 {1883). 
38 1 CHITTY~ THE CRIMINAL LAw *73 {1836). 
89 MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 16 (1930). 
4° Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 107 Eng. Repr. 15, 19 {1822). The exami-
nation by the justice of the peace, it will be noted, corresponded in many details with 
present-day police methods of interrogating the accused. 
41 On the trial it was immaterial to the admissibility of such record that ques-
tions had been asked by the examining justice. 2 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, sec. 848 
(1923). 
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at the trial, and almost the first step in the later proceeding was to 
read to the jury this compulsory examination of the accused.42 
Under the statutes of Philip and Mary a justice of the peace really 
acted as police, constable, detective, prosecuting attorney, examining 
magistrate and complaining witness. 43 In the hands of unscrupulous 
magistrates such a system lent itself to abuse. 44 Prosecuting zeal pre-
vailed over judicial disinterestedness. Harsh methods were employed 
in the procurement of evidence and the treatment of the prisoner.40 
Leading and ambiguous questions were asked to confuse him. 46 
Treachery and corruption were common sins of the justices, so that the 
preliminary examination became an instrument of blackmail and op-
pression. 47 But in spite of all this the ancient English justice of the 
peace, in exercising his power to interrogate the prisoner, compared 
favorably with some modern police in one respect - he did not resort 
to torture as a regular part of his practice. 48 
The statutes of Philip and Mary, insofar as they ordained an in-
quisitorial preliminary examination, were doomed to suffer judicial 
nullification. By the beginning of the I 8th century the rule against 
self-incrimination was fully established. The spirit of that rule must 
have been carried over to the preliminary examination, for in this ex-
amination there was evident a gradual abandonment of judicial in-
terrogation of the accused. 49 The practice developed of taking only a 
voluntary statement by the accused after cautioning him as to his 
42 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 8II (1923); E. D. Corwin, "Supreme Court's Con• 
struction of the Self-Incrimination Clause," 29 MICH. L. REV. I at 3 (1930). 
43 Judge Simeon E. Baldwin, "Preliminary Examination in Criminal Proceed-
ings," 6 A. B. A. REP. 225, 230 (1883}; I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LA.w OF ENGLAND 225 (1883); MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 15 (1930). 
0 "I do not think any part of the old procedure operated more harshly upon 
prisoners than the summary and secret way in which justices of the peace, acting fre-
quently the part of detective officers, took their examinations and committed them for 
trial." I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 222 (1883). 
45 Several instances are related in I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LA.w OF 
ENGLAND 222 (1883). See the account of Magistrate Aleyn in MoLEY, OUR CRIMI• 
NAL COURTS 14 (1930). 
46 MITTERMAIER, STRAFVERFAHREN 69 (1851), 
47 MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL COURTS 16, et seq. (1930). 
48 MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 16, et seq. (1930). 
49 William A. Maury, "Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to Testify," 
14 AM. L. REV. 753 at 757, 761 (1880); MITTERMAIER, STRAFVERFAHREN 69, 70 
(1851). The difference between the earlier practice carrying out the purpose of the 
statute and the later practice departing from it is adverted to in his caustic fashion by 
Bentham in 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 256, 257 (1827). 
48 
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rights.50 It was even questioned in a late case under these statutes 
whether the justice had a right to interrogate the prisoner, so uncom-
mon had the practice of interrogation become. 51 Though the statutes 
did not grant the right, the practice was developing of permitting the 
accused to have counsel at this examination. 52 The preliminary exam-
ination was no longer looked upon as a device for the more effective 
prosecution of the prisoner but had come, instead, to be regarded as a 
privilege of the accused whereby an opportunity was given him for 
self-exculpation. 58 
A factor hastening the transformation of the preliminary examina-
tion from an inquisitorial proceeding into a judicial inquiry was the 
gradual sloughing off by justices of the peace of their duties as police 
and prosecuting officials and the fixing of their status as judicial officers. 
The final differentiation in function of magistrate and policeman was 
signalized by the creation in the early part of the last century of an 
independent metropolitan police. u Long before 1 848, the inquisitor-
ial preliminary examination as provided for by the statutes of Philip 
and Mary had sunk into oblivion and a purely judicial inquiry had 
supplanted it. In that year, a statute formally repealed the provisions 
dating from 1554 and 1555, and definitely established the judicial in-
quiry type of preliminary examination in English criminal procedure. 55 
Under this statute, the prisoner, after the examination of witnesses for 
the state, is asked if he cares to make a statement, but is first warned 
that he is under no obligation to do so, and that whatever he may say 
will be used against him. 56 Judicial interrogation of the prisoner is 
considered improper in modern English practice. 57 Though the statute 
50 
I CHITIT, CRIMINAL I.Aw *85 (1836); Rex v. Green, 5 Car. & P. 312, 172 
Eng. Repr. 990 (1832). 
51 Rex v. Wilson, I Holt N. P. 597, 171 Eng. Repr. 353 (1817). This case was 
disapproved however in Rex v. Ellis, R. & M. 432, 171 Eng. Repr. 1073 (1826). See 
Stephen, I JURIDICAL Soc1ETY PAPERS 456, 469 (1858). 
52 The practice is referred to in Cox v. Coleridge, I B. & C. 37, 107 Eng. 
Repr. 15, 19 (1822). 
GS I CH1TIT, CRIMINAL I.Aw *83 (1836). See also Joy, CONFESSIONS 92-94 
(1843). -
H See MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 19 (1930). Also MAITLAND, JUSTICE AND 
POLICE 100 (1885), 
55 II & IZ Viet., c. 42, sec. 18 (1848). The provisions of this act relating to the 
preliminary examination of the accused were not substantially altered by the Criminal 
Practice Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V., c. 86, sec. 12. 
55 The changes affected by this legislation in relation to the early statutes of Philip 
and Mary are discussed in I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
221 (1883), and MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 19 (1930). 
57 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL I.Aw oF ENGLAND 441 (1883); 2 
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does not require the preliminary examination to be open to the public, 
it is so in practice. Gs The same holds true as to the right to counsel. G9 
The preliminary examination is a judicial inquiry conducted for the 
purpose of determining whether the evidence presented justifies con-
tinued retention of the prisoner either in custody or on bail to await 
formal accusation, and admits of no interrogation by the magistrate. 
This type of examination is today firmly entrenched in English prac-
tice and accords with the tradition of scrupulous fairness to the accused 
that characterizes criminal procedure in that country.60 
2. Preliminary Examination in America 
In America the history of preliminary examination follows a course 
parallel to that run by the English institution whence it was derived. 
Despite the modern notion that judicial interrogation of the accused is 
in contravention of common-law traditions,61 early colonial history re-
veals that interrogation by the magistrate was common practice. 02 The 
WIGMORE, EvmENCE 185 (1923). There is a mistaken belief on the part of some in 
this country that English practice authorizes the asking of questions of the accused by the 
magistrate. See, for instance, IZ A. B. A. J. 692, art. i, note (1926). 
58 AM. L. INST. CoDE oF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 185 (1928). 
G
9 AM. L. INST. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 185 (1928), 
60 The English attitude favoring the judicial inquiry type of preliminary exami-
nation as fairer to the prisoner in contrast with the inquisitorial system of the Conti-
nent is reflected in I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 441 
(1883); REPORT OF CoMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAw IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS, an 
excerpt from which is found in 4 WJGMORE, EVIDENCE 825 (1923). 
61 See FouRTH REPORT OF THE NEw YoRK COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND 
PLEADING-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, :xxvii (1849); In re Bates (D. C. S. C. 1858) 2 
Fed. Cas. No. 1099a; Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244 (1882); Commonwealth v, Smith, 
185 Pa. St. 553, 569, 40 Atl. 73 (1898). 
62 Early colonial practice is reflected in the following excerpt from GovERNOR 
WILLIAM BRADFORD'S HISTORY OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 390: 
"2. Quest: How £arr a magistrate may extracte a confession from a delin-
quente, to acuse him selfe of a capitall crime, seeing N emo tenetur prodere 
seipsum. 
"Ans: A Majestrate cannot without sin neglecte diligente inquision into 
the cause brought before him. If it be manifest that a capitall crime is com-
mitted, and that comone reporte, or probabilitie, suspition, or some complainte 
(or the like), be of this or that person, a magistrate ought to require, and by all 
means to procure from the person (so £arr allready bewrayed) a naked confession 
of the fact, as apears by that which is morall and of perpetuall equitie • • • 
for though nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, yet by that which may be known to 
the magistrate by the forenamed means, he is bound thus to doe, or else he may 
betray his countrie and people to the heavie displeasure of God. • • ." 
The most noteworthy illustration extant on the records was the examination of 
Ann Hutchinson by the court at Newtown in 1637. See 1 HART, AMERICAN HISTORY 
ToLD BY CoNTEMPORARIES 382 (1898); C. F. ADAMS, ANTINOMIANISM IN THE CoL-
50 
No. 8 REMEDY FOR THIRD DEGREE 
statutes of Philip and Mary formally instituting the inquisitorial type 
of preliminary examination were part of the colonial law and were 
considered operative after the separation from England. 63 It is prob-
ably true, however, that interrogation of the accused as a general prac-
tice ceased long before the repeal of the statutes of Philip and Mary 
and the legislation which created the judicial inquiry type of examina-
tion. 0' The establishment of the rule against self-incrimination, with 
its significant reaction in England resulting in abolition of the practice 
of interrogating the accused, had the same effect in the American colo-
nies. Formal constitutional recognition of the rule contributed to the 
tradition already accumulating against exercise of inquisitorial powers 
by the magistrate or justice of the peace. In addition there were in 
American history forces inimical to the exercise of police functions by a 
magistrate. In a frontier country the prosecuting attorney, and even 
more the sheriff, eclipsed the justice of the peace as investigators of 
crime. 65 The idea of. separation of powers peculiar to the American 
political system further emphasized the differentiation in function be-
tween police and magistrate, thereby leaving in sharper profile the ju-
dicial character of the latter's office. 66 But insofar as the statutes did 
not fall into disuse they were eventually repealed by express legislation. 
It is true that under some of the earlier statutes, representing a depart-
ure in only some features from those of Philip and Mary, unlimited 
power of interrogation was still exercised by the magistrate, and though 
he was required to warn the prisoner of his right to keep silent, the 
accused's failure to speak in answer to the interrogatories was used 
against him at the trial. 61 Subsequent legislation put an end to that 
lingering practice. By I 8 5 I all traces of the inquisitorial preliminary 
examination as a legally-established step of criminal procedure had dis-
oNY OF MASSACHUSETI'S BAY 235-284 (1894). The writer last cited refers to this 
trial as "a barefaced inquisitorial proceeding." I THREE EPISODES OF MASSACHUSETI'S 
HISTORY 488 (1892). 
63 Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86 (Pa. 1781); Report of Judges of Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, Appendix in 3 Binney 620 (1808); In re Bates (D.C.S.C. 
1858) 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1099a. 
6' "Whether, prior to the disappearance of the inquisitorial features from the 
English system, the American magistrates exercised like power is not entirely clear. 
• • • It is clear that for a long time the accepted status of the magistrate in prelim-
inary examinations has been judicial." MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 20 (1930). 
65 MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 20 (1930). 
66 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 88 (1930). 
61 This was the practice in New York as indicated by the FoURTH REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING -CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
xxviii (1849). Also in Louisiana, as indicated in I CoMPLETE WoRKS OF EDWARD 
LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 356 (1873). 
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appeared. Today the judicial inquiry type prevails in this country.08 
Indeed, in the absence of statutory authorization no power of interroga-
tion is vested in the magistrate at all.09 _ ' 
The purposes of the preliminary examination as conducted today 
are: to determine whether the evidence presented by the state justifies 
holding the prisoner for formal accusation, to preserve the evidence, 
to keep witnesses within control, to fix bail, and to allow a prisoner a 
chance to exculpate himself and regain freedom. 70 In all the states, 
after the magistrate has heard the witnesses for the prosecution, he may 
ask the prisoner if he wishes to make a statement; he must first caution 
the prisoner as to his right to keep silent, and warn him that what he 
says will· be used against him. 11 In four states legislation directs the 
magistrate to inform the defendant that he has a right to make a state-
ment in his own behalf, that "he is at liberty to waive making a state-
ment" and that "his waiver cannot be used against him on the trial"; 
if the defendant chooses to make a statement the magistrate then puts 
to him a prescribed series of questions with regard to his name and 
age, residence, business or profession, and concludes as follows: "Give 
any explanation you may think proper of the circumstances appearing 
against you, and state any facts which you think will tend to your 
exculpation." 12 In four states provision is made that the magistrate 
may examine the accused. 73 But investigation has shown that in none 
of these states does the magistrate examine the prisoner as permitted by 
68AM. L. INST. CooE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 26 (1928). 
69 Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244 (1882). 
70 1 B1sHoP, NEw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, sec. 239a (1913); Rosenberry, J., in 
Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N. W. 539, 541 (1922); MoLEY, OuR 
CRIMINAL CouRTS 21 (1930). 
71 Only a few statutes expressly authorize the magistrate to take a voluntary state-
ment, but in the absence of express authorization it is allowed at least so as to make a 
confession thus obtained admissible in evidence. For collection of statutes see AM. L. 
INST. CoDE oF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 208 (1928). 
72 AM. L. INST. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. I, 206 (1928). 
Minor variations as to specific details are to be found in the statutes authorizing such 
limited interrogation. 
In a jurisdiction that authorizes the magistrate to ask a designated set of ques-
tions, it is improper for the magistrate to ask questions other than those formally pre-
scribed. People v. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557 (1872). 
The idea of a formal set of questions whereby limitations are placed on the range 
of the magistrate's interrogation was advanced by Livingston in his model code of 
criminal procedure. 2 COMPLETE WoRKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE - CoDE OP 
PROCEDURE, art. 173. His proposal was adopted by the New York Code Commis-
sioners in their Report of I 849. 
73 AM. L. INST. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. x, 208 (1928), 
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the statute. H The explanation lies in the fact that no pressure can be 
brought to bear on the prisoner to make him speak, and consequently, 
unless he volunteers a statement, interrogation by the magistrate is 
wasted e:ff ort.115 
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This brief resume of statutory provisions relating to preliminary 
examination makes clear that no legal means is available for confront-
ing the accused with the charge against him, challenging him to explain 
the evidence pointing to his guilt, interrogating him as to incriminating 
circumstances, and producing in evidence against him at the trial his 
refusal to explain or answer. The Wickersham Commission makes a 
fundamental error as to the existing law when it comes to. the conclus-
ion that "the best remedy for this evil [ third degree] would be en-
for cement of the rule that every person arrested charged with crime 
should be forthwith taken before a magistrate, advised of the charge 
against him, given the right to have counsel and then interrogated by 
the magistrate." 16 The modern preliminary examination admits of no 
magisterial interrogation. No judicial pressure of any kind can be 
brought to bear on the accused to make him speak. 
The preliminary examination is today an inoccuous proceeding. 
Professor Moley declares, "Nearly everyone in the system believes 
the preliminary hearing to be practically unnecessary. . The 
prosecution views the preliminary hearing as a mere perfunctory de-
tail." 11 It is not strange that judges are reluctant to compel the police, 
HAM. L. INST. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 209 (1928). 
Only in one state, North Carolina, where the statute is mandatory, does the magistrate 
examine the prisoner, and there the accused is entitled to counsel. Ibid. 
115 Another factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the modern preliminary 
examination as a means of securing information from the prisoner, apart from the lack 
of power in the magistrate to interrogate the accused, is the right of the prisoner to 
have the aid of counsel during the examination. In a large number of states it is 
· expressly provided that the accused shall be apprised by the magistrate of his right to 
counsel and that opportunity shall be given the accused to secure the aid of counsel. 
AM. L. INST. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 190, 195 (1928). 
In New Jersey, where the accused has no right to counsel at the preliminary examina-
tion, he is nevertheless in practice granted the privilege. I bid. 
16 Report No. II, 5 (1931). (Italics ours). This erroneous assumption is 
pointed out by Professor Waite in 30 MicH. L. REv. 54, .58 (1931). It is possible 
that the Commission did not mean to state existing rules of law at this point but in-
tended rather to suggest reforms. However, since all the requirements first mentioned 
are generally recognized by rules of law now existent, the coupling of these require-
ments with a non-existent requirement of interrogation by the magistrate is at best 
seriously misleading and objectionable on that ground. 
11 OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 31 (1930). See also WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 201 (1929). For a description of the operation of mag-
istrates' courts in all their "grimy and sordid reality," see MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL 
CouRTS 29 (1930); also WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. 8, n, 12 (1931). 
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whose coercive methods are productive of confessions, to observe the 
rule requiring prompt presentme.r:tt before a magistrate in whose 
presence the prisoner can bask in privileged silence. 
THE REMEDY PROPOSED 
The preceding discussion shows the ineffectiveness of existing 
checks on unlawful police practices; it shows that there is no adequate 
legal method of interrogation at present; and it shows particularly that 
interrogation is necessary to satisfy the motives which actuate police in 
their illegal conduct and which induce magistrates to connive at it. 
The remedy proposed consists of two essentials: 
(I) That the accused be promptly produced before a magistrate 
for interrogation; and, 
( 2) That the interrogation be supported by the threat that refusal 
to answer questions of the magistrate will be used against the accused 
at the trial. 
It •is submitted that the two features of the proposed plan must be 
linked tog~ther. The magistrate must have power to interrogate the 
prisoner. The present system which allows the accused an opportunity 
to make a statement but denies the magistrate power to ask questions 
is not effective for the purpose of securing information. And the 
power to interrogate must be supported by some compulsion to answer 
questions; otherwise it will be rendered impotent. Neither is the 
compulsion afforded by the right to comment on failure to testify at the 
trial sufficient. The comment must be upon the prisoner's refusal to 
answer questions at the interrogation. It is true that some writers have 
asserted that the problem of the police third degree would be solved if 
the judge and prosecutor were given the right to comment on the pris-
oner's failure to testify at his trial. 78 But analysis of that proposition 
makes the conclusion appear to be a non sequitur. The possibility that 
at the trial an inference of guilt may be drawn from the accused's sil-
ence is hardly equivalent in the eyes of the police to a confession or 
other valuable information obtained shortly after arrest. In other 
words, making criminal procedure at the trial more effective against 
78 Moorefield Storey, "Some Practical Suggestions as to the Reform of Criminal 
Procedure," 4 J. CRIM. L. 495, 503 (1913); Judge E. Ray Stevens, "Archaic Consti-
tutional Provisions," 5 J. CRIM. L. 16, 18 (1914); Z. Chafee, Jr., 40 NEW REPUBLIC 
266, 267 (1924). 
It should be noted that Professor Chafee's views as expressed in 40 NEW REPUB-
LIC 266, 267 (1924) have been modified as a result of his investigations for the 
Wickersham Commission. See supra, note 4. 
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the accused does not satisfy police motives that demand interrogation 
immediately upon arrest.79 The fact that in New Jersey, where com-
ment on accused's failure to take the stand is allowed, police continue 
to practice third degree methods is persuasive proof that the right of 
comment furnishes no magic wand for the reformation of police prac-
tices. 80 For the purpose of remedying the third degree the psychic 
compulsion produced by the threat of comment is of no value unless 
that threat stares the accused in the face immediately upon arrest. 
The plan proposed of requiring prompt interrogation by a magis-
trate supported by the threat of comment on failure to answer carries 
considerable promise.81 The plan necessarily involves prompt produc-
tion of the accused before a magistrate. This is a sine qua non in the 
mitigation of third degree abuses, for so long as prisoners are in the 
control of officers there is a temptation to resort to third degree prac-
tices. 
The plan provides an immediate opportunity for questioning the 
accused while the pursuit is still hot and the clues are yet fresh. By 
warning the accused that the whole record of the interrogation will go 
to the trial court, so that his silence in refusing to answer questions or 
make explanations will be used with telling e:ff ect against him before 
the jury, a strong psychic pressure will induce him to break his silence. 
19 Z. Chafee, Jr., 148 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 6z1, 6z4 (1931); W1cKERSHAM 
CoMM. REP. No. II, nz (1931). 
80 HoPKINS, OuR LAWLESS PoucE 178 (1931); WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. 
No. II, IIZ (1931); Z. Chafee, Jr., 148 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 621, 6z4 (1931). 
Likewise in Ohio, where the constitutional amendment of 19IZ gives the right of 
comment, police methods are apparently not affected thereby as indicated by third 
degree practices in Cleveland, WICKERSHAM COMM. REP, No. II, 118 (1931), and 
the tactics employed by the Columbus police in the Snook case. Snook v. State, 34 
Ohio App. 60, 170 N. E. 444 (19z9). 
81 A number of writers have advocated magisterial interrogation as a remedy for 
police third-degree methods. Among them are the following: Judge Simeon E. 
Baldwin, in 6 A. B. A. REP. zz5 at z38 (1883), whose plan is approved by Professor 
Waite in 30 M1cH. L. REv. 54 at 58 (1931); z W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE 199 (1923); 
Z. Chafee, Jr., 40 NEW REPUBLIC z66 at 267 (19z4); Judge Knox, 74 U. PA. L. 
REv. 139 at 153 (1925); A. Johnstone, Jr., 125 ANN. AMER. AcAD. No. 214, p. 94 
(19z6); National Crime Commission of.Am. Bar Ass'n., IZ A. B. A. J. 692 (19z6); 
F. Irvine, 13 CoRN. L. Q. ZII at z17 (1928). 
This is the remedy advocated by the W1cKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. 11, p. 5; 
also No. 4, pp. z6, 38 (1931). See 30 M1cH. L. REv. 54, 58 (1931). 
A suggestion to the same effect is found in W. Mikell's editorial preface in 
EsMEIN's HISTORY OF CoNTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE xxxi (1913). 
Not all the writers referred to in this note advocate the corollary measure that the 
refusal to answer the magistrate's interrogatories be the subject of comment at the 
trial. 
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Nor should it be forgotten that the larger number of those who are 
arrested are willing to speak and answer questions.82 Even the fact of 
a false statement made by a prisoner after arrest in order to cover his 
guilt can be used against him at the trial often with as much effective-
ness as a truthful incriminating statement. Questioned immediately 
upon arrest, the accused does not have time to work out a coherent 
fabricated story or defense alibi. From the viewpoint of police psy-
, chology it appears that inauguration of a scheme of magisterial inter-
rogation will greatly weaken the police motive for private interroga-
tion since that motive will find vicarious expression in a substituted de-
vice. Viewing the problem historically, Dean Pound ascribes the extra-
legal development of the "unhappy system of police examination" in 
the United States to the sloughing off by justices of the peace of their 
police powers, including examination of the accused, thereby leaving 
"a gap which in practice had to be filled outside of the law." 83 The 
proposed plan would fill the gap which resulted from the differentia-
tion in function between magistrate and police with the effect of forc-
ing the police to adopt the system of extra-legal interrogation. It 
would vest the power of interrogation in officers who are better quali-
fied to exercise the power of interrogation fairly and effectively. 
It must be conceded that the inauguration of judicial examination as 
here proposed would not result in the complete stamping out of third 
degree practices. 84 Magisterial interrogation with the right to com-
82 "In Washtenaw County, Michigan, of the 312 judgments of the county court 
in criminal cases in one year, 305 were on pleas of guilty. The prosecuting attorney's 
explanation of his success in obtaining so many confessions of guilt was his practice of 
himself interviewing every person arrested on a felony charge immediately after the 
arrest while he was still excited and before he had opportunity to consult with a law-
yer. In that way, the prosecutor said, he got the truth. None of the confessions were 
repudiated in court nor did any of the 305 defendants make allegations of mistreat-
ment. If all be as it appears, that prompt interrogation produced justice." 30 M1cH. 
L. REv. 54 at 59 (1931). 
83 CruMINAL JusTJCE IN AMERICA 88 (1930). See also W1cKERSHAM CoMM, 
REP. No. 8, pp. 9, 10 (1930). 
84 Several unconvincing objections to the plan as a remedy for the third degree 
should be noted. Justin Miller declares that the police are not interested in a voluntary 
statement made by the accused before a magistrate. I 5 A. B. A. J. 414 at 41 5 ( I 929). 
But this objection presupposes a toothless kind of examination which prohibits interro-
gation and which brings no pressure on the accused to compel him to speak. 
An objection made by Professor Chafee that if the prisoner is committed to jail 
for contempt on failure to answer, the opportunity for third-degree practices by the 
police will not be impaired, presupposes commitment as a penalty for maintaining sil-
ence. 148 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 621 at 626 (1931). But that is.not essential to the 
plan; it is penalty sufficient that the accused's failure to answer will be admissible at 
the trial as evidence of guilt consciousness and subject to unfavorable comment. 
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ment as the only coercive factor would not serve all the purposes served 
at present by secret police inquiry. It is not difficult to imagine cases, 
particularly those of hardened recidivists, in which silence would be 
maintained in face of the magistrate's interrogation despite the unfav-
orable inference to be drawn therefrom, the accused preferring to 
gamble on a jury trial. Another possible criticism of the proposed plan 
of interrogation as a cure for the third degree is that it offers no ade-
quate remedy for the situation resulting from police arrests supported 
by little or no evidence. False arrests are notoriously common these 
days, ~d it has been suggested that third degree practices are in many 
instances mere "fishing expeditions" for the procurement of informa-
tion vindicating unwarranted arrests. 85 If .a police officer has taken a 
man into custody without cause and has no objective evidence tending 
to link him with a crime, questioning by the magistrate may prove to 
be a bootless affair; and the only end served by the questioning will be 
to expose the officer's error in making the arrest. Magisterial interro-
gation does not satisfy police motives in a case of that kind; in fact, the 
very contrary conclusion must be reached for no officer will take the 
chance of this exposure. 86 With regard to the effectiveness of magis-
terial interrogation in securing clues as to the whereabouts of stolen 
property or information of a kindred kind, doubt must also be ex-
pressed, for an offender may be willing to talk, either in self-incrimi-
nation or in self-exoneration, and yet may refuse to divulge informa-
tion as to the fruits of his wrongdoing; allowing an inference of guilt 
to be drawn from silence will not improve this situation. Furthermore, 
it is doubtful whether interrogation unaccompanied by the use of physi-
cal force will result in information from an accused person as to the 
identity of accomplices. The code of honor among gangster criminals 
precludes "squealing''; perhaps nothing less than physical force will 
elicit this kind of information. 
In view of these insufficiencies of the method of interrogation pro-
posed, there appears to be some justification for the conclusion of the 
85 HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 98 (1931). 
86 Perhaps some of the abuses resulting from attempts by the police to justify false 
arrests would be eliminated by legalizing some types of arrest which are now unlaw-
ful. The existing rules as to arrest place undue restrictions upon an officer from the 
viewpoint of social control. See J. B. Waite, "Some Inadequacies in the Law of 
Arrest," 29 M1cH. L. REv. 448 ( I 93 I). It has been pointed out that as a conse-
quence of Massachusetts legislation legalizing the arrest by police of a person abroad 
at night whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design, there are fewer false 
arrests by the Boston police; reducing the number of false arrests is in turn reflected in 
abatement of third-degree practices. W1cKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. II, 108 (1931). 
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drafters of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure 
that "while the chief reason advanced by those who favor the system 
[interrogation by the magistrate] is that it will do away with the 'third 
degree' there is no assurance that such result would follow." 81 Strong 
police motives in particular cases will be unsatisfied and officers will 
continue to use physical force on the prisoner and retain him for pro-
longed detention accompanied by interrogation unless an order of mag-
istrate or judge intervenes. Professor Morley makes the significant 
statement that in France, where the preliminary examination by the 
fuge d'instruction is a characteristic feature of criminal procedure, "bru-
tality and high-handed methods by the police are not all eliminated by 
the system of examinations." 88 
The probability that a proposed remedy will not be a panacea for 
all ills should not, however, blind the critic to its substantial worth. 
Assuming that magisterial interrogation of the accused will not furnish 
a complete remedy for the third degree evil, it does not follow that it 
should be rejected. Not only the real and supposed shortcomings of 
the proposed plan from the viewpoint of police psychology need to be 
considered but also its merits from the same viewpoint. It seems 
probable that the larger number of those now subjected to police inter-
rogation would be taken by the police before a magistrate for immediate 
interrogation. That itself would be a gain. The implications of this 
gain are also significant. If in the greater number of instances police 
voluntarily took the prisoner to a magistrate or justice of the peace for 
interrogation, police habits would be formed which would have a cumu-
lative effect in undermining the third degree as a police institution. 
And, in evaluating the probable effectiveness of a system allowing 
magisterial interrogation, weight must be attached to the effect of the 
existence of such procedure on the attitude of prosecutor, judge, and 
magistrate toward third degree practices. As previously pointed out, 
judge and magistrate cannot be expected to insist on enforcement of the 
rule requiring prompt production of the accused before a magistrate 
until some lawful method is substituted for the present system of police 
interrogation. The substitution of magisterial interrogation should re-
move motives for conniving at unlawful police interrogation and at the 
87 TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 27 (1928). For criticisms of the plan as a remedy 
for the third degree see the article by Professor Chafee in 148 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 
621 at 626 (1931). 
88 OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS 41 (1930). But see the observations as to French 
practice made under the next heading of the text. 
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same time furnish the magistrates with an incentive to insist on their 
own prerogatives. 89 
I. Possible Objections 
Conceding that third degree abuses would be mitigated by magis-
terial interrogation, the question remains whether the benefit hoped 
to be derived would not be more than offset by new evils introduced. 
The prime objection to a system of magisterial interrogation goes to the 
danger of its abuse. "In the hands of petty bureaucrats," says Dean 
Wigmore, "whether under James the First, or under Philip the Sec-
ond, or in the twentieth century under an American republic, such a 
system is always certain to be abused." 90 A magistrate with an unlim-
ited power of interrogation is likely to proceed on the assumption that 
the accused brought before him is guilty; he tends to become domineer-
ing and over-zealous in the effort to ferret out incriminating informa-
tion; he loses his judicial disinterestedness; leading, ambiguous, and 
confusing questions characterize his contest with the accused. 91 The 
experience in France points to the possibility of such abuse.92 The 
questioned prisoner, particularly if he is of a weak and timid character, 
in the confusion of the moment, is either inveigled or bullied into mak-
ing false and contradictory statements to be later used against him at 
the trial with deadly effect.93 The danger of abuses becomes particu-
89 Nor should it be forgotten that the proposed plan may be effective in helping 
to crystallize public opinion against the present system of police interrogation. The 
failure of the public to become aroused except momentarily over the Wickersham 
Commission's Report on police lawlessness may be attributed in part to public acquies-
cence in police methods as supplying a need which our formal procedure does not 
satisfy. After stating his belief that proposed remedies by way of improvement of 
criminal procedure would not go far to prevent existing abuses, Mr. Bates Booth, writ-
ing in 4 So. CAL. L. REv. 83 at IOO (1930), concludes; "Perhaps there is no solu-
tion but the solution of an enlightened public demand." Perhaps the difficulty is not 
that the public is not enlightened but that it is unwilling to demand cessation of prac-
tices believed essential to safeguard the social order. 
90 4 EVIDENCE 823 (1923). In the light of the abuses which Dean Wigmore 
believes inevitably attend an inquisitorial procedure, it is difficult to understand why 
he should urge a preliminary interrogation of the accused by a skilled magistrate. 2 
EVIDENCE 199 (1923); see supra, note 81. 
91 1 LIVINGSTON, WORKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 355 (1873); REPORT 
OF CoMMISSIONERS oN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS (1848), found in 
part in 4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE 825 (1923). See also infra, notes 92 and 93. 
82 J. W. Garner, "Criminal Procedure in France," 25 YALE L. J. 255 at 260 
(1916); WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 205 (1929). For 
abuses under the old English statutes of Philip and Mary, see text, supra, with authori-
ties cited in notes 45 and 46 supra. A modern instance of abusive interrogation in an 
American court is reported in Commonwealth v. Smith, 185 Pa. St. 553, 40 Atl. 73 
(1898). 
93 REPORT oF CoMM1ss10NERS oN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS 
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larly acute in the case in which little or no objective evidence has been 
secured against the accused, and the examination degenerates into a 
fishing expedition. The prisoner's whole past life is bared for inspec-
tion in the hope that there may be revealed some act to which criminal 
liability may be fastened.9' Innocent persons would be subjected to 
blackmail and extortion at the hands of unscrupulous magistrates. 00 
The viciousness of this feature, it is contended, would be heightened in 
American practice because of official corruption and the large number 
of groundless arrests made by the police. 
(a) As to Undue Pressure Used to Obtain Confessions. When the 
worst has been said about magisterial interrogation, its vices do not 
equal those of present police third-degree methods. Among critics of 
the system of interrogation it has never been claimed that the prisoner 
is subjected to the pressure of physical torture. Even the early English 
justice of the peace, acting under the statutes of Philip and Mary, was 
not accused of doing violence to the prisoner in the process of interroga-
. tion. That the police resort to torture is the chief complaint against 
third-degree practices. If all the objections to magisterial interroga-
tion were as serious as painted and were irremediable, the absence of 
physical torture under this system would still mark an advance. Of the 
abuses which have been charged against the system,, the most serious is 
that the magistrate tends to bully and browbeat the prisoner into mak-
ing incriminatory statements. Certainly a prisoner has to face a trying 
ordeal in going through an interrogation of that type. But discomfort 
of the accused is not necessarily unfairness in the larger sense. There 
is nothing to indicate that the French system results in any higher per-
centage of unwarranted convictions than our own. 96 If the prisoner is 
misled at the interrogation into making false or contradictory state-
ments, he always has the opportunity of explaining these statements to 
(1848), found in part in 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 825 (1923); 2 BEST, EVIDENCE 
950-978 (1876). See also the criticism found in WAITE'S CASES ON CRIMINAL LAw 
AND PROCEDURE 6 I 9, note 26 ( I 93 I), with reference to proposed legislation authoriz-
ing interrogation. 
A classic example of the French system at its worst is found in Brieux's story, 
La Robe Rouge, an excerpt from which is found translated in MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL 
CouRTS, Appendix B (1930). 
Dean Wigmore is of the opinion that the Continental practice is "united with a 
spirit of petty judicial license and browbeating, dangerous to innocence •••• " 4 
EVIDENCE 824 (1923). 
94 See account by E. Kelly, "The French Law of Evidence," 19 AM. L. REv, 
380, 397 (1885), of an examination by a French juge d'instruction. 
95 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 823 (1923). 
96 See article by E. Kelly, 19 AM. L. REV. 380 at 398 (1885). 
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a jury at the trial. It is submitted that too large a part of what goes by 
the name of "unfairness" in such cases is simply a maudlin sympathy 
for inexperienced but guilty persons. To say that it is unfair to an inex-
perienced criminal who has not acquired facility in fabricating defense 
alibis or learned that silence is the safest policy, to subject him to inter-
rogation calculated to expose his guilt, is to exhibit an altogether un-
warranted solicitude for the wrongdoer.97 A criminal prosecution 
should not be viewed as a game or contest in which the inexperienced 
off ender has any claim to a handicap so as to put him on an equality 
with the hardened offender in the race against justice.98 
Under the American system the danger of real unfairness is 
lessened by the fact that the magistrate is a strictly judicial officer. In 
the modern Continental procedure, and the same was true in early 
English practice, the magistrate who conducts the examination of the 
prisoner is at one and the same time police officer, prosecutor, and 
judge. With the functions of these officers all combined in a single 
person, the temptation to abuse is greater and the possibility is more 
acute that judicial disinterestedness will succumb to prosecuting zeal. 
Where, as here, the police magistrate is a judge, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that he will display a sense of judicial propriety and restraint in 
questioning the accused. But it might be desirable, in line with the 
notion of separating judicial and prosecuting functions, to vest the 
primary power of interrogation in the prosecuting attorney rather than 
in the magistrate. It might be felt that the prosecutor would be more 
adept in questioning prisoners; and the magistrate would have less 
reason to lose his quality of judicial disinterestedness. Those favoring 
a system of interrogating the accused may accept this alternative pro-
posal without serious objection provided that the plan were flexible 
enough to allow the magistrate to interrogate if the prosecutor were 
unable to be present. Sometimes the prosecutor or his deputy would 
not be available at the precise moment, yet the interrogation should 
not be halted on that account, for questioning loses much of its value 
unless it takes place immediately. 
97 The argument that interrogation would not be "fair" to the prisoner is included 
in the criticism quoted in WA1TE's CASES ON CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 619, 
note 26 ( 193 l), of proposed legislation authorizing magisterial interrogation. See 30 
M1cH. L. REv. 54 at 60 (1931) • 
Much the same considerations apply to "unfairness" in questioning persons who, 
though not personally guilty, are endeavoring to shield the guilty and who would, of 
course, prefer not to be subjected to interrogation. . 
98 On the idea of "fairness" to the prisoner, or the "fox-hunter's reason," see 5 
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238 (1827). 
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Furthermore, public opinion should serve as an effective check on 
abuses of power by the magistrate. This public opinion would operate 
in two ways. It would frown upon arbitrary acts by a judge which it 
might condone if they were done by a policeman. And public opinion 
would make itself felt through the ballot. The magistrate's office is 
usually an elective office. With all responsibility for interrogation 
centered in him, unfavorable publicity that might leak out as to high-
powered methods used on prisoners would react with disastrous effect 
on his political fortunes. 
Another possible check on arbitrariness which suggests itself is to 
allow the prisoner the right to counsel during interrogation. But such 
a suggestion encounters serious objections. If time must be allowed 
until counsel is procured, the preliminary interrogation will lose its 
effectiveness. Its value depends upon interrogation immediately upon 
arrest.99 There is the additional objection that the attorney's mere 
physical presence will give the prisoner a moral support which will in-
terfere with that psychic state which guarantees the effectiveness of the 
proposed interrogation. And the attorney will discourage spontaneity 
of responses by his client, urge him to be guarded in his replies, en-
courage him to fabricate a denial or alibi, and make vexatious objec-
tions to questions put by the magistrate, so that the procedure will be 
throttled at this point.100 It is submitted, therefore, that to grant to the 
prisoner the right to counsel during the interrogation will defeat the 
very purpose of the plan.101 
99 Referring to the psychological phenomenon presented by the case of a sus• 
pect making a confession immediately after arrest upon solicitation by the police, Dean 
Wigmore says that the "explanation seems to be that the long-continued nervous inhibi-
tion of all utterances, in fear of revealing clues to guilt, imposes a terrific strain, like 
that of a tightened steel spring; that the arrest shows the guilty person that this strain 
of repression is futile and is no longer needed; and that hence, in the sudden release of 
the inhibition, it is a genuine relief to be able to tell freely the whole story. After 
this sense of neroous relief hos passed, tke inclination to tell disappears; and most' 
confessions are in fact made within a short time after arrest" (italics the writer's). 
2 EVIDENCE 198, note 3 (1923). 
100 See W. H. Taft, "The Administration of Criminal Law," 15 YALE L. J. I 
at 8 (1905); E. Kelly, 19 AM. L. REv. 380 at 398 (1885). According to Professor 
Garner there is some dissatisfaction in France with the change effected by the law of 
1897 which gave the accused the right to counsel during the preliminary examination 
by the juge d'instruction. M. Loubat, Procureur-Generale of Lyons, is quoted as 
saying: "It is permissible to say without exaggeration that the law of 1897 has given 
to malefactors rights the need of which is not felt and which are exercised only to the 
detriment of those of society." 25 YALE L. J. 255 at 259, note 16 (1916). 
101 It is true that right to the assistance of legal counsel seems to be considered 
essential by a number of students of criminal procedure, including those who advo• 
cate the type of preliminary examination that is characterized by interrogation of the 
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(b) As to "Fishing Expeditions." The objection that interroga-
tion would degenerate into a mere fishing expedition in the hope of un-
covering a shady spot in the accused's career proceeds on the premise 
that the proposed plan of interrogation would give the magistrate an 
unbounded power of inquiry. This is true of French procedure. But 
the magistrate should be limited to the specific charge for which the ac-
cused is under arrest. What assurance is there that the magistrate 
would so confine his questioning? In the first place, a complete record 
should be kept of the interrogation, to be presented at the trial later. 
If improper questions have been asked, such questions and the re-
sponses thereto would be ruled out as inadmissible in evidence. Sec-
ondly, the magistrate would not be under the same inducement to con-
duct a fishing expedition as is a police officer under the present system. 
As stated previously, much prolonged interrogation by the police re-
sults from the attempt to justify an unwarranted arrest. That motive 
would be absent in the case of magisterial questioning. 
(c) As to Blackmail and Extortion. The objection of Dean Wig-
more that inquisitorial examination of the accused will lead to black-
mail and extortion of the innocent is founded on experience in Conti-
nental countries and in early England. Again the point is important 
that the magistrate under our system is a strictly judicial officer. In 
Continental countries (and in early England), the magistrate has po-
lice and prosecuting functions as well. With all of the steps in the 
preliminary procedure in the hands of a single person, the opportunity 
for extortion is particularly inviting. Whereas with the differentiation 
in function provided by our system, mutual checks are created which 
reduce the chance that innocent persons will be subjected to threat of 
exposure. Conceding that there may be some abuse of that kind, it is 
deni~d that it constitutes a serious impeachment of the proposed plan. 
Also it should be repeated, as to this danger, that the present system of 
police interrogation lends itself more easily to this form of abuse than 
the system which is proposed.102 
accused. See Irvine, 13 CoRN. L. Q, 2II at 217 (1928); Z. Chafee, Jr., 40 NEw 
REPUBLIC 266 at 267 (1924); WICKERSHAM CoMM. REP. No. 11, 5 (1931). Es-
µiein, in his HISTORY OF CoNTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 601 (1913), rates the 
French legislation of 1897 giving the prisoner the right to counsel as one of the 
"measures which place the French system of law in the vanguard of progressive legisla-
tion." But see supra, note 100. 
102 Another evil particularly emphasized by Dean Wigmore is that "any system of 
administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-
disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby." 4 EvmENCE 824 
(1923). See also an article by A. L. Lowell, "The Judicial Use of Torture," 1 I 
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(d) As to Lack of Skilled Magistrates. An objection which goes 
not to danger of abuse but to possible effectiveness is that the system 
requires skilled magistrates who are not available in our political sys-
tem. Expert questioning that would uncover flaws in the accused's 
story, bare inconsistencies, and by stratagem catch him off guard repre-
sents an art developed by training and experience, and requires as a 
foundation an intimacy with principles of judicial proof. How eff ec-
tively the power of interrogation would be exercised by justices of the 
peace - often laymen - and police magistrates, is problematical. The 
draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Proced-
ure considered this a serious obstacle to the introduction of the Conti-
nental system.103 Conceding that these judicial officers do not have 
the skill and training essential to interrogation of the most efficacious 
type, it is not to be inferred that the system would mark no improve-
ment over present police methods. Objectors are constantly overlook-
ing the fact that the first concern is to mitigate abuses of the present 
practice.· Police-lieutenants and detectives have even less skill and 
training for the task of interrogation than police magistrates and jus-
tices of the peflce could be expected to have. There are, in fact, police 
lieutenants and detectives who have acquired proficiency in the art of 
interrogation despite the lack of formal training. Constant practice has 
produced skill and facility. In gauging the capacity of the average 
magistrate to conduct a skillful interrogation of the prisoner, allowance 
must be made for the restrictions hitherto placed on his power of in-
terrogation. If police-officers and detectives can acquire a measure of 
skill in the art of examination, the same result may be fairly anticipated 
with regard to magistrates. 
2. Constitutional Questions 
(a) The Right to Counsel at the Interrogation. It may be ques-
tioned whether legislation would be valid which deprived the prisoner 
of the right to counsel at the interrogation before a magistrate.10' The 
question has never been before the courts for decision, so that an an-
swer can represent only conjecture. The courts have considered the 
HARV. L. REv. 290 at 299 (1897). The simplest answer to this objection is that 
the morale of the administration of justice will not be impaired as much under the 
proposed plan as it is under the present third-degree system. 
103 AM. L. INST. CooE OF CRIM, PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 27 (1928). 
A like view is expressed by Professor Chafee in 148 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 621 at 626 
(1931). 
10
' For constitutional provisions of this kind, see AM. L. INST. CooE OF CRIM, 
PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 190, et seq. (1928). 
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question whether the right to counsel extends to the modern type of 
preliminary examination and have divided on that question.105 At first 
sight it might appear that an interrogation of the accused made a still 
stronger case for vindication of the constitutional guarantee of right to 
counsel. But it is submitted that the constitutional right does not ex-
tend to the proposed system of judicial interrogation. This right is 
like the right of the accused to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him and the right to cross-examine them. All these rights apply to a 
judicial hearing in which guilt or probable guilt is to be determined. 
They do not apply to inquiries by the police, by the prosecutor, or by 
the grand jury, intended merely for the purpose of acquiring evi-
dence.106 Even by the most severe critics of modern police methods no 
claim has been· made that private police interrogation of the accused in-
tended to elicit a confession violates his right to counsel. A voluntary 
confession to the police is always admissible in evidence; where a con-
fession is excluded it is not on the ground that the accused is denied the 
right to counsel but on the ground that the confession is involuntary. 
The same principle applies to confessions made to the magistrates. 
There is no reason why an interrogation aimed at obtaining a confes-
sion should be transformed in constitutional character merely by the 
fact that it is conducted with proper safeguards and by an officer who, 
on other occasions, exercises strictly judicial powers. 
(b) The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. "No person ..• 
shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against him-
self," is the provision of the federal Constitution, and the provisions of 
the state constitutions are similar in eff ect.101 Are these provisions 
violated by a procedure which requires the accused to submit to interro-
gation by a magistrate and permits comment at the trial on his refusal 
to answer questions at the interrogation? This question naturally di-
vides itself into two: 
Do the constitutional provisions grant to the accused a com-
plete immunity from interrogation? And if they do not, 
Does the indirect pressure furnished by threat of comment on 
his refusal to answer questions "compel" him to be a witness against 
himself in violation of the privilege? 
105 The cases are collected in AM. L. INST. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE 
DRAFT No. 1, 193 (1928). 
· 106 Reference is here made to the case where the grand jury is conducting an in-
vestigation. 
107 For a collection of provisions in state constitutions securing the privilege 
against self-incrimination, see AM. L. INST, ADMIN. OF CRIM. LAw, TENTATIVE DRAFT 
No. 1, 35 et seq. (1931). 
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(I) As to Interrogation. It must be admitted at the outset that 
compulsory interrogation is forbidden on all occasions. It matters not 
whether it be interrogation at the trial, at the preliminary hearing,108 
or at some police or magisterial inquisition prior to either.10g In fact, 
historically it was the application of the oath "ex officio" at the prelim-
inary inquiry which provoked the struggle resulting in the establish-
ment of the rule against self-incrimination.110 It is submitted that we 
must differentiate carefully between interrogation simpliciter and inter-
rogation under compulsion, and that the former does not constitute a 
violation of the constitutional privilege. Certainly it has been and 
continues to be the practice in some states for the magistrate to question 
the accused after warning him that he need not answer, and it has never 
been suggested that this practice was unconstitutional. And no one has 
ever suggested that interrogation by the police of a suspect was un-
constitutional, unless it was accompanied by physical violence or other 
unlawful pressure. It is inconceivable that express statutory authori-
zation of magisterial interrogation designed to eliminate the abuses of 
police methods should be regarded as constitutionally more objection-
able.111 
(z) As to Comment on Refusal to Answer. Assuming that interro-
gation as such is not prohibited, would a statute authorizing comment 
on refusal to answer questions put by the magistrate be unconstitution-
al? That the possibility of such comment brings a psychic pressure to 
bear on the accused impelling him to speak is evident; 112 in fact this 
pressure is the very object of the provision. The constitutional ques-
tion is whether it is such compulsion as violates the privilege. 118 There 
is good authority for the opinion that such a statute would violate the 
lOS 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 835 (1923). 
109 There is an increasing tendency to call third-degree practices of the police un-
constitutional. See cases collected in WICKERSHAM CoMM, REP. No. II, 27 (1931); 
HoPK1Ns, OuR LAWLESS PoLicE 306, et seq. (1931). 
110 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 823 (1923). 
111 It is true that questioning of the accused has often been referred to as inimical 
to the spirit of the privilege. See FoURTH REPORT OF NEw YoRK CoMMISSIONERS ON 
PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS - CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, xxvii ( 1 849) ; In re 
Bates (D. C. S. C. 1858) 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1099a; Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244 (1882); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 185 Pa. St. 553, 569, 40 Atl. 73 (1898). 
mi This appears from an inquiry conducted among Ohio prosecuting attorneys as 
to the effectiveness of the Ohio constitutional amendment of 1912 allowing comment, 
W. T. Dunmore, "Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify," 26 YALE L. J. 464 
at 466 (1917). 
113 It has been held that allowing comment on failure to testify at the trial is not 
a denial of due process under the Constitution. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U, S, 
78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (1908). 
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privilege against self-incrimination.114 But this opinion, it is believed, 
is not supported by a consideration of the purpose of the privilege and 
the relevant cases. Historically, the privilege grew out of the em-
ployment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an ad-
mission of his guilt. 1i 11 And in face of our modern unequal struggle 
with crime, there is no good reason for extending the scope of the 
privilege beyond the purpose for which it was originated. Under the 
proposed plan for interrogation the accused still has his election to 
speak or to keep silent; he is not - as any other witness would be in the 
circumstances-committed for contempt for his refusal to speak. To 
use the constitutional language - he is not compelled to be a witness 
against himself. Insofar as his silence exposes him to an inference of 
guilt, he is merely subject to the effect of an ordinary rule of evidence 
applied in all other instances where appropriate. Drawing such an in-
ference from a refusal to answer questions which a person would nat-
urally answer if innocent is an inevitable logical process based on hu-
man experience and common sense.116 
There are no direct authorities on the point. The closest analogy 
is furnished by the right of the court or prosecutor to comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify at the trial. Even as to this right the 
direct authorities are few. This is due to the fact that, under the old 
common-law practice, the question of comment could not arise. The 
accused, like parties to a civil action, was incompetent as a witness and 
could not take the stand in his own behalf. Silence under such circum-
stances was meaningless. When "criminal evidence acts" for the first 
time made the accused a competent witness at the trial, they generally 
provided that the prisoner's failure to take the stand should not give 
rise to any inference or presumption against him, and that it should 
lH AM. L. INST. CooE OF CRIM. PRoc., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 27 (1928}; 
CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL L1MITATIONs, 7th ed., 447 (1903); 15 M1cH. L. REv. 423 
at 424 (1917). 
115 4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE 863 (1923). See also infra, note 124. Wigmore 
apparently concedes that allowing the inference to be drawn would not be unconstitu-
tional, although he believes it would result in emasculation of the privilege. 4 
EVIDENCE 899, 890. 
116 Storey, 4 J. CRIM. L. 495 at 501, 505 (1913); Baldwin, 6 A. B. A. REP. 
225 at 233 (1883); 29 M1cH. L. REv. 783 (1931). 
Dean Wigmore is of the opinion that allowing an inference to be drawn from 
failure to testify would have the same disastrous effect in weakening the morale of the 
administration of justice as would a rule compelling the accused to testify under pain 
of judicial process. 4 EvIDENCE 900 (1923). But it is submitted that the proposed 
plan will not constitute as great a threat to the undermining of police morale as does 
the present third-degree system. 
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not be subject to comment by court or prosecutor.111 The English 
statute, however, was narrower; it only prohibited comment by the 
prosecution. It was held not to prohibit comment by the court on 
the accused's failure to testify.118 This interpretation may be ex-
plained merely as an application of an ordinary canon of statutory con-
struction. But it is not without great significance that this_ interpreta-
tion has been adopted in England where the rights of accused per-
sons have been so meticulously safeguarded by the courts. The right of 
the court to comment on the accused's failure to take the stand is in 
effect held not to be violative of the purpose of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. In New Jersey the question was even more defi-
nitely presented. After a statute made the accused a competent wit-
ness in his own behalf, it was held that the common-law privilege 
against self-incrimination did not prohibit comment by the court on the 
accused's failure to take the stand.110 The decisions in Maine in the 
face of a constitutional provision regarding self-incrimination reached 
the same result.120 It appears, then, that respectable authority sustains 
the proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination does not 
preclude comment on failure of the accused to testify. Opposed to 
these actual holdings are not a few statements to the effect that a 
statute authorizing comment would be unconstitutional.121 But, as 
Judge Hiscock of the New York court of appeals has pointed out, 
these statements are mere dicta, not actual holdings, since in each case 
the statute did prohibit comment or at least was construed not to 
authorize such comment.122 Under the federal Constitution it is 
extremely improbable that an act of Congress authorizing comment 
111 For collection of statutes see 4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, sec. 2272 (1923); AM. 
L. INST, ADMIN. OF CR1M. LAw, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, 37, et seq. (1931). 
Where the statute forbids drawing an inference from the accused's failure to testify, 
it applies to any preliminary proceeding as well as the trial itself. Swilley v. State, 
73 Tex. Cr. 619, 166 S. W. 733 (1914); 4 WJGMORE, EVIDENCE 902 (1923). 
118 The Queen v. Rhodes, L. R. [1899] I Q, B. 77, 83. See also Kops v. Re-
gina [1894] A. C. 650. 
119 Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 Atl. 651 (1898). 
120 State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 216 (1867); State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 
(1871). See also dictum in Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450, 87 N. E. 755 
(1909). 
121 People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 529 (1869); Petite v. People, 8 Col, 518 
(1885); Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239 (1877); Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 
213, 221 (1871); Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231, 233, 14 S. W. 603 (1890); State 
v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565 (1868). 
122 "Criminal Law and Procedure in New York," 26 CoL. L. REv. 253 at 260 
(1926). In People v. Reese, 258 N. Y. 89, 179 N. E. 305, 309 (1932), Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo added a word of caution: "We have no thought in thus holding to inti-
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on the prisoner's refusal to take the stand or answer questions put by a 
magistrate would be held unconstitutional as violating the self-incrim-
ination clause. In Twining v. New Jersey there was involved the val-
idity of a New Jersey practice which permitted comment on the fail-
ure of an accused to testify.128 The Supreme Court assumed.for the 
purpose of the argument that the practice would violate a constitutional 
provision against self-incrimination, but held that it did not contravene 
the due process clause of the Constitution. The court was careful to 
call attention to the fact that it only assumed, and did not hold, such 
practice to be violative of a provision against self-incrimination. Mr. 
Justice Moody, speaking for the court, said: "We do not intend, how-
ever, to lend any countenance to the truth of that assumption." And 
Professor Corwin, speaking to the same point in a recent excellent 
article, says, "It is highly doubtful if the Supreme Court regards this 
doctrine [ that the court has no right of comment] as sanctioned by the 
Constitution." 124 To confine the privilege within narrow limits seems 
to be the tendency of the courts at the present time.125 Adoption by 
Ohio of a constitutional amendment authorizing right of comment on 
failure of the prisoner to testify,126 and recent legislation effecting the 
same change in Iowa, South Dakota, and, apparently, in Louisiana, are 
indicative of a legislative tendency in the same direction.121 The 
mate a belief that a statute permitting adverse comment in such circumstances would 
impair the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." 
128 211 U.S. 78, u4, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (1908). 
124 29 MICH. L. REV. 191 at 200 (1930). 
The late Chief Justice Taft was of the opinion that the privilege was intended to 
protect only against torture in extorting testimony from the accused's own lips. I 5 
YALE L. J. 1 at 9 (1905). See also statement from Mr. Justice Cardozo, quoted 
supra, note 140, in an opinion delivered while yet on the New York court of appeals. 
Judge Baldwin was of the opinion that the privilege was not so broad as to in-
clude freedom from inference and comment. 6 A. B. A. REP. 225 at 240 (1883). 
See also Judge Knox's views expressed in 74 U. PA. L. REv. 139 at 149 (1925). 
125 In United States v. Murdock, 52 Sup. Ct. 63, 76 L. ed. 83 (1931), it was 
held that the possibility of incrimination in a state jurisdiction did not warrant the 
assertion of the constitutional privilege in federal proceedings. See comment in 41 
YALE L. J. 618 at 621, 624 (1932); 45 HARv. L. REv. 595 (1932); 30 MICH. L. 
REV. II16 (1932). 
In State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 Atl. 828 (1929), it was held that a 
statute prohibiting comment did not protect the prisoner from any unfavorable infer-
ence that the court might draw from the prisoner's exercise of his privilege. See 
comment on the case in 16 VA. L. REV. 79 (1929) and 28 MICH. L. REV. 78 (1929). 
126 Constitution of 1851, art. 1, sec. 10, amendment of 1912. 
127 lowa Sess. Laws of 1929, p. 311; S. D. Sess. Laws of 1927, p. II6; La. Code 
of Crim. Proc., 1929, art. 461, by omission of the final clause which appeared in 3 
Wolff's Stat., 1920, p. 2217, "and his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create 
any presumption against him," apparently sanctions comment by both the judge and 
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opinion is ventured that statutes authorizing comment on the failure of 
the accused to testify will, when tested, be sustained as valid. On the 
same reasoning, comment on the refusal of an accused to answer ques-
tions at a magisterial interrogation should be upheld. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the proposed plan requiring the 
accused to submit to interrogation before a magistrate immediately 
upon arrest and making his silence the subject of inference and com-
ment at the trial is not violative of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Mere interrogation of the accused without undue pressure is not 
violative of his privilege. Nor, considering the purpose of the privi-
lege and its history, should a threat of comment on the refusal of the 
accused to answer questions be deemed compulsion so as to vitiate a 
statute providing for magisterial interrogation. 
the prosecuting attorney. AM. L. lNsT. ADMIN. OF CRIM. LAW, TENTATIVE DRAFT 
No. 1, 40 (1931). The constitutional question will not arise in Iowa since the 
privilege against self-incrimination is not embodied in the organic law; in South 
Dakota and Louisiana the constitutional issue has not yet been raised. 
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